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1. I am a Lecturer in Politics at Canterbury Christ Church University. For several years, I 
have been working on issues of devolution, federalism and secession. I am co-lead of 
the UACES-JMCT research network ‘(Re)Imagining Territorial Politics in Times of 
Crisis’. Since 2018 I have been working as an advisor to the Hanns Seidel Foundation 
on federal reform in Myanmar. I am currently working on a forthcoming book on the 
management of autonomy and secession in Spain and the UK. I am making this 
submission in a personal capacity. 
The Balance of Powers
2. It is clear given the sustained support for independence in Scotland, rising support for 
independence in Wales (or at least, independence-curious voters) and growing debate 
on a border poll in Northern Ireland, that there is appetite for change to the 
constitutional status quo. 
3. Interest in federalism has gained traction in recent years among all pro-Union parties, 
and in the aftermath of the EU referendum was offered by some as a constitutional 
response to manage the territorial challenges precipitated, revealed and exacerbated 
by the vote.i There is, however, little evidence that there is much public support for 
federalisation. 
4. As a scholar working on federalism, I consider it to be an ideal solution for the UK, and 
one which would address some if not most of the issues outlined below in section 2. 
Federalism would entrench an equal legal status among the central and devolved 
governments in the UK and address the neglected element in the UK’s constitutional 
architecture: shared rule. Realistically, however, this is never going to happen – it 
would require a complete overhaul of the UK’s constitutional and territorial architecture. 
Discussions on federalism falter on several fronts, specifically, what to do with England 
(with 85% of the population and as the biggest nation within the UK), the paucity of 
pro-federal public opinion, the entrenched notion of parliamentary sovereignty which 
is antithetical to the federal idea, and the traditional aversion towards federalism 
among British political elites, notwithstanding what Michael Burgess identified as ‘the 
British Tradition of Federalism’.ii 
5. Another territorial option that may merit further research would take the shape of a 
federacy or confederal arrangement. This would, contrary to the current dominant 
opinion among pro-Union political elites, create an even looser union. Interestingly, the 
SNP vision for independence advanced in the 2014 referendum campaign (with 
emphasis on maintaining shared unions with the rest of the UK) had hallmarks of a 
confederal approach.
Current Challenges  
6. There are three broad challenges I would highlight that relate to institutional set-up as 
well as intangible elements vis-à-vis political culture and understandings of devolution 
and the Union. 
7. One of the primary challenges regarding multilevel governance in the UK is the 
absence of shared rule. Shared rule, which refers to the capacity of subnational 
governments to participate in and influence decision-making processes at the centre, 
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is best understood as the glue that holds a federal political system together. It is, 
however, a neglected element in the UK’s constitutional architecture. The emergence 
of shared competence in areas such as taxation and welfare as a result of the 2012 
and 2016 Scotland Acts as well as increased shared policy areas because of EU 
withdrawal and the repatriation of powers from Brussels, necessitates mechanisms to 
facilitate cooperation and co-decision-making between the different governments, but 
no tangible reform has been forthcoming. The structures of intergovernmental relations 
(IGR) in the UK remain weak, not fit for purpose and require serious reform. 
8. A second challenge in the current constitutional set-up relates to political culture. 
Despite the reality of political decentralisation for over two decades, very little has 
changed at the centre in both Westminster and Whitehall. A unitary attitude prevails. 
The recent passing of the Internal Market Act demonstrates this point. This Act entails 
significant implications for devolution but was not the result of intergovernmental 
agreement. Legislative consent was sought and refused by all three legislatures, but 
the bill proceeded. In recent years, little regard has been shown for the Sewel 
Convention, notwithstanding the (symbolic) importance attached to it in the Scotland 
and Wales Acts. Lamentably, there is growing evidence of a willingness to bypass 
important conventions and undermine fundamental tenets of the devolved settlements 
- ‘seek and ignore’ has become the dominant mentality vis-à-vis legislative consent. A 
political culture, predicated on important principles and values such as, mutual respect, 
partnership, recognition, and trust, is all but absent. 
9. The final issue relates to understandings of devolution and the Union. One of the 
principal strengths of British unionism is that it means different things to different 
people. I welcome the increased attention paid to the Union in recent years by the UK 
Government, but would caution against the imposition/promotion of a particular 
understanding of the Union, including attempts to narrow it down to a particular thing 
or set of beliefs (a point I return to in section 5). Quite simply this runs contrary to the 
multifarious understanding of British unionism and risks being counterproductive in 
further loosening rather than bolstering the bonds of Union it is seeking to protect. 
10. As for devolution, there is an apparent lack of knowledge about devolution, how the 
devolved systems work and the implications of this for central state machinery (the 
Covid pandemic was rather revealing in this regard) in Westminster and Whitehall. The 
consequence of this is a top-down, unitary vision of politics that translates into an 
approach that often denies the decentralising logic that has taken root in the UK over 
the last two decades.
11. On interparliamentary interaction, I would argue that increasing interparliamentary 
interaction and oversight would go a long way in improving the UK’s constitutional 
architecture. Interparliamentary relations remain a somewhat neglected element in the 
UK, and unlike the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), which brings together the four 
governments, there is no permanent structure that does the same for the four UK 
legislatures. The Interparliamentary Forum on Brexit, as well as joint meetings between 
various committees in the different parliaments, demonstrate the benefits in providing 
an arena to forge a more constructive working partnership between the legislatures. 
This is certainly an area of reform that merits further consideration by the committee.
12. In my research on managing demands for autonomy in Scotland, the British-Irish 
Council was occasionally mooted by various parliamentarians, including pro-
independence MSPs, as an effective forum to bring the different governments 
together. For these MSPs, the standing secretariat of the Council which has 
responsibility for the technical work required for these meetings, enhanced the quality 
of discussions as well as facilitated good working relationships between members. In 
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addition, unlike the hierarchical JMC, the British-Irish Council is considered a meeting 
of equals, notwithstanding the differing roles and responsibilities of each government. 
English Devolution
13. I agree that there should be a greater distinction between the roles played by the UK 
Government as both the government of the UK and the government of England only. 
This was laid bare during the first phase of the Covid pandemic when UK Government 
communications repeatedly failed to acknowledge that its authority in certain matters 
extended to England only. Indeed, during a debate in the House of Commons in May 
2020, the Prime Minister rejected the notion that his authority in certain matters 
extended to England alone, even though this is certainly the case.iii This reinforces the 
point above about a lack of understanding regarding the consequences of devolution 
and reveals an inherent tension in the UK because of the absence of a devolved 
executive/legislature in England. Greater consideration should be given to 
differentiating the two roles, not least in relation to communications. 
14. Another contentious aspect of English devolution that was further spotlighted during 
the pandemic was the need for improved relations between central and local 
governments, more specifically, leaders and mayors of combined authorities. There is 
no intergovernmental arena that brings together the UK Government and directly 
elected mayors, and while Sadiq Khan, as Mayor of London, was invited to COBR 
meetings at the height of the pandemic in 2020, the invitation was not extended to the 
rest of England’s directly elected mayors. In fact, relations between the UK government 
and local government were characterised by hyper-centralism. Reform is required to 
create machinery to facilitate intergovernmental interaction. There should be specific 
English representation in wider IGR structures involving the devolved governments as 
well as a separate England-specific forum to bring together relevant ministers and the 
leaders and mayors of combined authorities. 
The UK’s Common Purpose 
15. Differing opinions on the common purpose of the UK is expected given the plurinational 
nature of the state. This is not unique to the UK and is a general trend in multilevel 
states. Confusion may arise in multilevel states because of the blurring of boundaries 
between the competence jurisdictions of the different levels of government. In this vein, 
the public may not always be aware which government is responsible for specific policy 
areas. 
16. Both during and in the aftermath of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, 
increasing attention has been paid to the UK’s common purpose. More recently, this 
has seen the creation of the ‘Union Strategy Committee’ chaired by the Prime Minister. 
This, as I noted earlier, is a welcome development in increasing awareness and 
knowledge about the Union at the heart of government. Whether this will have much 
success in promoting the UK’s common purpose remains to be seen, although I am 
sceptical. The idea of a binding purpose is normally something that naturally develops 
because of lived experience and not something that is easily and artificially engineered. 
17. Given the explicit challenges to the continuation of the Union, it is understandable that 
the UK Government will want to raise the profile of its activities in the devolved nations, 
and by extension emphasise the common purpose of the Union. Recent initiatives that 
have been discussed include the flying of the Union flag from government buildings,iv 
UK government ‘branding’ on infrastructure projects in the devolved nationsv and new 
spending powers in devolved areas.vi Lessons here should be drawn from other 
plurinational states such as Canada whereby these initiatives have been employed 
with varying degrees of success. For instance, the promotion of the Canadian flag as 
4
a symbol of pride to decrease support for Quebec independence was generally 
interpreted as a waste of public resource, while the use of the federal spending power 
has proven to be a largely controversial aspect of Canadian federalism. This ‘intrusion’ 
has been strongly opposed by successive governments in Quebec which perceive it 
as an attempt by the federal government to unilaterally appropriate Quebec’s policy 
jurisdictions. 
18. It is not yet clear how the UK spending power will be used and to what extent devolved 
governments will be involved in decision-making processes on this. It is, of course, 
within the purview of the UK Government to spend money in the devolved territories, 
but it would make sense that this is done in collaboration with the devolved 
governments, and certainly not against their will. The new spending powers may 
represent a more assertive pro-Union position on the part of the UK Government, but 
in failing to work with the devolved governments this is likely to exacerbate extant 
tensions and create new ones. It is true that most voters are unlikely to question the 
source of funding for new projects/improved infrastructure, but in the context of 
competing political parties, a unilateral approach to spending by the UK Government 
is likely to be used by some parties as a point of grievance from which to make political 
capital. An adversarial and provocative strategy is likely to further erode trust between 
the governments and unlikely to highlight the benefits of union. If viewed through the 
prism of imposition and appropriation of competence in devolved policy jurisdictions, it 
may even bolster support for secession.
19. I am also cautious of the focus on flag waving. This is unlikely to reinforce the bonds 
of Union or reify the common purpose of the UK. In fact, there is a risk that the flying 
the flag strategy inadvertently becomes a symbol of exclusion rather than inclusion. 
Promotion of the common purpose of the UK is likely to be successful when employed 
in a more subtle rather than explicit manner. 
Revisiting Structures 
20. A pressing issue that requires formalisation in the UK’s constitutional architecture is 
reform of IGR. As highlighted by the recently published Dunlop Review this is an area 
of reform that requires some serious, bold and imaginative thinking. To demonstrate a 
real commitment to IGR and thus the Union, there is a need for a fundamental shift at 
the centre. In light of Brexit and the lack of effective intergovernmental interaction that 
characterised that period, engagement with the devolved governments necessitates 
significant enhancement. 
21. It is worth reiterating, however, that while institutional reforms are important, these will 
have limited effect if not undergirded by a fundamental change in attitude, culture and 
mindset. Prospects of fully-fledged federalism may remain low, but this does not 
preclude the opportunity to learn from and develop a more federal political culture, 
predicated on values and principles such as respect for autonomy, equality, 
partnership and recognition.
22. One of the biggest challenges for a union-state, particularly the UK which has several 
overlapping unions, is forging an overall vision for the state. It is understandable, 
therefore, that attention has turned to fixes such as a new Act/Charter of Union, 
although I foresee several challenges to this approach. The first issue is the fact that 
the beauty of unionism is that is can be interpreted and construed by different people 
in different ways. It would be impossible to capture this in a single act. The risk here is 
that emphasis on certain aspects may – however inadvertently – undermine others 
and thus alienate other understandings of the Union. Second, the shared vision of the 
Union that one would expect the act to detail will have limited effect unless it is 
understood and (more importantly) believed by citizens. Put simply, it runs the risk of 
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being just a statement rather than an actual vision shared by the different peoples of 
the UK. Finally, the values that are often discussed in relation to a new Act of Union 
(rule of law, equality, tolerance and respect etc.), as laid out in the Act of Union Bill 
presented in 2018 by Lord Lisvane, are not uniquely British values. Indeed, not only 
are these universal values, but they are the same values that are espoused by Irish, 
Scottish and Welsh nationalists. I am not convinced that a new Act/Charter of Union 
will necessarily bring coherence to the Union. 
23. A challenge likely to be encountered in the creation of a new Act/Charter of Union is 
that on the one hand it may be too specific that it becomes a source of alienation, or, 
on the other hand, it is too abstract that it does not mean much. I believe it more 
worthwhile to focus attention on institutional reform and practices to engender a more 
plurinationally sensitive and federal political culture among political elites. In so doing, 
these reformed institutions and changed mindset can put the various values and 
principles into practice. This is likely to be more effective than a statement of intent in 
an Act/Charter of Union. 
24. In comparison to other states - Canada and Spain are cases in point - the UK (more 
often than not) has managed to eschew the angst and acrimonious debates that have 
ensued because of proposals for constitutional change. Acknowledgement of the UK’s 
plurinationality, coupled with recognition of nationhood, has helped avoid the pitfalls 
experienced by other plurinational states which have repeatedly struggled with 
definitions around nationhood. It may be the case that attempts to define such things 
in a new Act/Charter of Union will precipitate problems rather than solutions.
25. In discussions on the merits of a new Act/Charter of Union, it is important to bear in 
mind that there is a risk in entrenching specific constitutional understandings or 
arrangements. It is well-established in research on federal political systems that there 
is a need for in-built flexibility to allow federations to change and adapt as necessary. 
A new Act/Charter of Union, akin to a constitution, should be treated as more than a 
mere document. It should be construed as a living document that may often require 
renewal. A constitutional pact between nations/peoples should not be treated as 
enduring just because a document says so. 
26. In terms of public knowledge and awareness on constitutional arrangements, I would 
agree that there should be more effort to increase knowledge about this. In recent 
years, the Houses of Parliament and devolved legislatures have devoted significant 
resource to enhance outreach in raising the profile of Parliaments, and the work they 
do. Online resources and public education play an important role here. Perhaps more 
collaboration between the outreach programmes of different legislatures would be 
useful. 
27. Further, it would be useful to explore lessons learned from the use of technology and 
online initiatives in schools during the pandemic and whether this could be used as a 
mechanism to further improve knowledge about the UK’s constitutional arrangements. 
I am not sure how this would help enhance public knowledge in general, but it would 
certainly prove a worthwhile resource in schools up and down the country. Indeed, it 
would remove the barrier of geography some students/schools may have in engaging 
with parliamentary education (i.e., travelling to London) and may prove a useful way to 
target young people to raise awareness about devolution, the Union and the various 
governments. 
i The Liberal Democrats have a long-standing policy in favour of federalism, there have been some 
lone voices in favour of federalism among Conservative parliamentarians (Murdo Fraser MSP and 
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David Melding MS), and the UK-wide Labour party, as well as Scottish and Welsh Labour, now argue 
in favour of federalism. 
ii Michael Burgess (1995). The British Tradition of Federalism. London: Leicester University Press. 
iii HC Deb, 11 May 2020. Vol 676, Col 33. 
iv Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. 2021. Union Flag flying guidance for UK 
Government Buildings.
v Lord Dunlop. 2021. Review of UK Government Union Capability.  
vi United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020.  
